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As should be clear, Modal Logic as Metaphysics owes a large debt to Kit Fine’s massive 
contributions to technical aspects of modal metaphysics, though it also takes issue with 
some of his proposals. In ‘Williamson on Fine on Prior on the reduction of possibilist 
discourse’, he defends much in his earlier proposals while providing it with a new basis. In 
this reply, I follow his order of discussion. 
 
 
1. What is the problem? 
 
Fine’s work on modal metaphysics is framed by the dispute between actualism and 
possibilism. Modal Logic as Metaphysics finds that dispute confused, and reframes modal 
metaphysics in terms of the clearer dispute between contingentism and necessitism. The 
first section of his paper argues that we should still focus on his original dispute rather than 
my proposed alternative. 
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 Fine does not deny that necessitism and contingentism are clearer doctrines than 
actualism and possibilism. The necessitist asserts ‘Necessarily everything is necessarily 
something’; the contingentist denies what the necessitist asserts. In Fine’s current 
formulation, the actualist asserts ‘Only actual objects are real’ (or perhaps ‘Necessarily only 
actual objects are real’); the possibilist denies what the actualist asserts. The necessitist’s 
assertion and the contingentist’s denial can be formulated in the language of first-order 
modal logic, with the quantifiers read absolutely unrestrictedly and the modal operators 
read metaphysically. By contrast, ‘actual’ and ‘real’ in the actualist’s assertion and the 
possibilist’s denial are not to be defined in the language of first-order (or higher-order) 
modal logic. Instead, Fine treats ‘actual’ as an undefined term, introduced by examples: 
Wittgenstein is actual, his children are merely possible. He introduces ‘real’ differently: to 
be real is to figure in reality, where the term ‘reality’ is itself undefined, though to some 
extent explained by a sketch of the role it is meant to play in metaphysical theorizing (Fine 
2009). Fine himself contrasts ‘the relatively obscure idioms of actuality and reality (or the 
like)’ with the language of quantified modal logic. 
 Of course, not even absolutely unrestricted quantification and metaphysical 
modality are above challenge. Fine himself rejects the former, though not the latter. 
However, he agrees with me that relevantly similar doctrines can be defined using even 
weaker resources. For instance, reinterpreting the quantifier as restricted to possibly 
concrete objects and the modal operator as restricted to physical possibilities preserves the 
most salient contrasts between contingentism and necessitism. Indeed, Fine’s formulations 
of actualism and possibilism themselves seem to require a quantifier unrestricted at least 
within reality, since ‘Only actual objects are real’ is equivalent to ‘Everything real is an actual 
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object’, where a restriction on ‘everything’ that excluded some real things would undermine 
the actualist’s intention. 
 Another apparent difference between the two pairs of doctrines is that whereas 
contingentism is the contradictory of necessitism, possibilism may be the contrary rather 
than the contradictory of actualism. For Fine allows that there may be impossible objects, in 
the sense of objects that are not even possibly actual. Consider the formally consistent 
metaphysical theory that some real things are necessarily actual, some real things are 
necessarily non-actual, and every real thing is either necessarily actual or necessarily non-
actual. That theory is inconsistent with actualism, but it also seems to be inconsistent with 
possibilism, on any natural understanding of that term. Thus a more general dispute may set 
actualism against its contradictory rather than against possibilism. However, that does not 
matter for present purposes. 
 Fine regards the dispute between necessitism and contingentism as clear enough to 
be getting on with. His principal objection to focussing on it is simply that he takes it to be 
obvious which side is right: necessitism. Indeed, he writes: ‘anyone in their right mind 
should accept necessitism’ and ‘the issue of necessitism versus contingentism is a non-issue 
and any right-minded philosopher should accept necessitism without further ado’. To back 
up these claims, Fine gives an example of counting the possible knives that could but never 
will be made from three given blades and three given handles (I use a similar example in 
favour of necessitism in Williamson 2000). He takes it as just evidently true that there are 
nine, as the necessitist says, not zero, as the contingentist says; for the contingentist to 
postulate a non-literal sense of the question to which they can regard the answer ‘nine’ as 
correct ‘is simply to put bad linguistics at the service of bad philosophy’. Naturally, I feel 
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some sympathy with Fine here, and he is under no obligation to spend more of his time on 
contingentism. But his impatient dismissal does not make the issue go away. 
 Fine does not quite say that all those in their right minds accept necessitism, just 
that they should do so; but what if they don’t? For instance, Robert Stalnaker presumably 
counts as in his right mind. He rejects necessitism and develops a contingentist alternative 
with a clear understanding of what is at issue (Stalnaker 2012). I regard him as wrong, but 
not as confused. One might hope to do better than just telling Stalnaker to ‘accept 
necessitism without further ado’. After all, many contingentists regard themselves as in a 
position to dismiss necessitism without further ado, for example on the grounds that it is 
just evidently true that the table is only contingently something. Conducted thus, the 
dispute between necessitism and contingentism faces deadlock. In logic, metaphysics and 
any other serious inquiry, we need methods that enable us to work through clashing senses 
of the obvious with some hope in the long run of an adequate resolution. Granted, most of 
what seems obvious to us is indeed true, but a methodology that crashes every time 
something false seems obvious is insufficiently robust for our purposes. Modal Logic as 
Metaphysics applies and recommends an abductive methodology for first principles of logic; 
it enlarges the evidence base on which we choose between them so that we can finesse 
deadlock on a few individual data points. That resembles what happens in natural science: if 
we cannot agree whether the outcome of a particular experiment refutes a theory, we can 
test the theory in other ways. 
 Whatever Fine’s individual preferences, those interested in modal metaphysics have 
collectively to engage with the issue between necessitism and contingentism. Moreover, 
since it concerns a central choice-point in how we reason about modal matters, with 
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ramifying consequences in many directions, it has to take a fundamental role in modal 
metaphysics. In comparison, Fine’s issue between actualism and possibilism looks 
secondary, because he in effect sets up the options as two types of necessitism. For he 
explains the term ‘actual’ through a contrast between two kinds of thing: those like 
Wittgenstein (the actual things) and those like Wittgenstein’s (merely possible) children (the 
non-actual things). But it is the necessitist who postulates things like Wittgenstein’s merely 
possible children. From a contingentist perspective, there are no such things, so no contrast 
with which to explain ‘actual’. 
 Once we understand the dispute between actualism and possibilism as a dispute 
between rival forms of necessitism, is it clear enough to be productive? Can we fruitfully 
investigate whether only actual objects are real? I do not regard the sentence ‘Only actual 
objects are real’, used in Fine’s way, as meaningless. It does not take much to avoid utter 
meaninglessness in a natural language, and Fine’s explanations of ‘actual’ and ‘real’ achieve 
that much. But I am sceptical as to how much more than that they achieve, especially in the 
case of ‘real’. It is not that theorists are obliged to define their new theoretical vocabulary in 
more basic terms; I agree with Fine that it would be unfair to demand such a reductive 
definition of ‘real’. Sometimes a new theory introduces a valuable distinction we could not 
previously make. But the theory needs to be a good one, to constrain the use of the term 
enough to be productive. In the case of ‘real’, I see no such theory. There are links with 
other vague phrases of the sort that hand-waving metaphysicians like to gesture with, such 
as ‘consist in’, ‘nothing more than’, and ‘account for’, which are used in characterizing the 
relation between the unreal and the real, but such links do not amount to a serious theory. 
In this respect, ‘real’ (in Fine’s sense) compares poorly with ‘necessary’ (in the metaphysical 
sense): our current theories of necessity are multiply constrained by logic, common sense, 
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and natural science (Williamson 2007; 2013; 201X) to a much greater extent than are our 
current theories of reality. If that sounds strange, that is because we tend to hear ‘reality’ in 
something like its ordinary sense, in which the primary contrast is with ‘appearance’, 
‘fiction’, and the like. Of course natural science tells us lots about what is as opposed to 
merely appearing to be, but that is not the contrast Fine intends with his special 
metaphysical sense of ‘real’. For in the latter sense, something can be, not just appear to be, 
yet not really be. That is why ‘reality’ talk in this special metaphysical sense is so much less 
constrained than it sounds.  
I will not insist here on scepticism about the metaphysical sense of ‘real’. As 
elsewhere, the proper test is an abductive one. If ‘real’ in that sense is latching onto 
something profoundly important, then we can expect it sooner or later to figure in powerful 
theories whose success it would be curmudgeonly to dispute. They might be like theories of 
natural or social science, only more abstract; they might be more like theories of logic, only 
more concrete; for present purposes it does not matter which. If such a theory does 
emerge, it will go far towards vindicating the importance of the dispute between actualism 
and possibilism as Fine understands it. At the time of writing, I see no such theory on the 
horizon. 
 I now turn to the question of mappings between contingentist and necessitist 
discourse (Williamson 2013, chapter 7), and between actualist and possibilist discourse. In 
early discussions of actualism and possibilism, such mappings were presented as 
translations between the actualist’s language and the possibilist’s language. The background 
assumption was that in effect the actualist and the possibilist spoke different languages, 
albeit homophonic ones: they assigned different meanings to the quantifiers, and 
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correspondingly different meanings to the sentences in which they occurred, and were 
speaking past each other when they appeared to disagree. The standard of correctness for 
the translations was that a sentence in the actualist’s language should be mapped to a 
sentence in the possibilist’s language with the same meaning, or at least the same coarse-
grained truth-condition, and vice versa. Modal Logic as Metaphysics argues against such a 
conception of the debate between contingentism and necessitism. My contingentist and my 
necessitist use a common language with shared meanings: in particular, they both use 
absolutely unrestricted quantifiers, as is the norm in metaphysics. They know what they are 
doing; there is no misunderstanding between them. Their apparent theoretical 
disagreement is just what it seems. No translation is needed, and no mapping from a 
sentence expressing contingentism to a sentence compatible with necessitism or vice versa 
is an adequate translation. As far as I understand the debate actualism and possibilism in 
Fine’s sense, it conforms to a parallel argument. The actualist and the possibilist assign the 
same meanings to ‘actual’, ‘real’, and the quantifiers, but may still disagree as to what is 
real. I will not labour these points here, because Fine does not argue that either debate 
depends on meaning variance between the two sides. 
 In some cases, necessitist discourse cannot be usefully mapped into contingentist 
discourse, or vice versa. For instance, an idiosyncratic necessitist might claim that even if a 
river were not spatiotemporally located, it would still be ugly or beautiful in ways that do 
not supervene on anything else. Few contingents would wish to capture those alleged 
distinctions in their own terms. Conversely, an idiosyncratic contingentist might claim that a 
number exists or not contingently in ways that do not supervene on anything else. Few 
necessitists would wish to capture those alleged distinctions in their own terms. However, 
those are unusual cases. More typically, each side regards the other’s discourse not as 
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capricious but as marking genuine distinctions, despite misdescribing them as a result of 
seeing them through the distorting lens of false metaphysical assumptions — like someone 
whose literal use of the sentences ‘The gods are angry’ and ‘The gods are not angry’ marks 
but misdescribes the distinction between situations in which there is thunder and situations 
in which there is no thunder.  Consequently, each side wishes to capture in its own terms 
the genuine distinctions the other’s discourse marks, purifying them of the misdescriptions.  
To make this idea more precise, Modal Logic as Metaphysics sketched a neutral 
sublanguage of the necessitist and contingentist’s shared language of quantified modal 
logic. Its sentences are neutral in the sense that they do not raise any of the issues in 
dispute between the necessitist and the contingentist. To start with contingentist discourse, 
the contingentist’s metaphysical theory is CON. The contingentist marks a distinction by the 
sentences A and B if and only if they are not equivalent given CON, in other words, the 
biconditional A ↔ B is not a logical consequence of CON. To capture this distinction in 
neutral terms, we want to map A and B to neutral sentences (A)con and (B)con respectively, 
which are not logically equivalent. By contraposition, if (A)con and (B)con are logically 
equivalent, then A ↔ B should be a logical consequence of CON: 
(F1) If |= (A)con ↔ (B)con then CON |= A ↔ B 
If B is already neutral, then (B)con should just be equivalent to B, for there is no purifying to 
be done. Since (A)con is neutral, this implies: 
 (F2) |= ((A)con)con ↔ (A)con  
(Compare proposition 1.3 at Williamson 2013, p. 371.) But from F1 and F2 we can deduce F3 
by substituting (A)con for A and A for B in F1: 
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(F3) CON |= (A)con ↔ A  
(Compare proposition 1.8 at Williamson 2013, p. 372.) Conversely, we can derive F1 from 
two instances of F3. Thus, for each sentence of the language, the mapping should give us a 
neutral sentence equivalent to it within the contingentist’s metaphysical theory. 
There is a parallel line of thought for necessitist discourse. The necessitist’s 
metaphysical theory is NEC. The necessitist marks a distinction by the sentences A and B if 
and only if the biconditional A ↔ B is not a logical consequence of NEC. To capture this 
distinction in neutral terms, we want to map A and B to neutral sentences (A)nec and (B)nec 
respectively, which are not logically equivalent; hence: 
(F4) If |= (A)nec ↔ (B)nec then NEC |= A ↔ B 
If B is already neutral, then (B)nec should just be equivalent to B, for there is no purifying to 
be done. Since (A)nec is neutral, this implies: 
 (F5) |= ((A)nec)nec ↔ (A)nec  
But from F4 and F5 we can deduce F6 by substituting (A)nec for A and A for B in F4: 
(F6) NEC |= (A)nec ↔ A  
(Compare proposition 1.21 at Williamson 2013, p. 373.) Conversely, we can derive F4 from 
two instances of F6. Thus, for each sentence of the language, the mapping should give us a 
neutral sentence equivalent to it within the necessitist’s metaphysical theory. 
 Since CON and NEC are mutually inconsistent but individually consistent, inevitably 
some biconditionals will be theorems of NEC but not of CON, and others will be theorems of 
CON but not of NEC. In such cases, the side for which A ↔ B is a theorem will regard the 
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other side as misdescribing the distinction they mark by applying A but withholding B or vice 
versa. 
 The derivations of F3 and F6 address Fine’s reasonable question as to why each side 
should want a neutral equivalent of each sentence A within the other’s theory, rather than 
simply looking at all the neutral consequences of A within the theory. Equivalents in the 
sense of F3 and F6 are needed to capture the distinctions the other side is marking but 
misdescribing. Without F3, F1 would not hold (since F2 is unproblematic), and without F6, 
F4 would not hold (since F5 is unproblematic). If two sentences with the same neutral 
consequences were not equivalent within the metaphysical theory, no distinction they 
marked could be captured in neutral terms. 
 Of course, as Fine indicates, we should aim to get more precise about where the 
pressure on each side is coming from to regard the other side’s discourse as marking 
genuine distinctions. It does not come simply from the bare nature of the metaphysical 
doctrines of necessitism and contingentism, for we have already seen that some versions of 
each put no such pressure on the other side. Instead, the pressure should come from more 
specific successfully working theories whose core of modal metaphysics is CON or NEC — 
somewhat as the pressure on nominalists to capture distinctions made in platonist 
mathematical terms comes from successful applications of mathematics in the natural and 
social sciences. Modal Logic as Metaphysics does not attempt to provide the details, but 
elsewhere I argue that applications of probability theory and dynamical systems theory in 
the natural sciences implicitly take for granted a necessitist modal logic (Williamson 2016). It 
is also plausible that much contingentist discourse marks genuine distinctions, even if it 
misdescribes them. 
11 
 
 
 Since the pressure to capture the distinctions marked by the other side’s discourse 
comes from various specific necessitist and contingentist theories, we should not expect the 
neutral zone to be constant irrespective of the specifics those theories. What is in dispute 
between one contingentist and one necessitist need not be in dispute between another 
contingentist and another necessitist. I allow for this by giving only a broad, deliberately 
schematic characterization of the technical term (‘chunky’) used to demarcate the neutral 
zone (Williamson 2013, p. 314). The book provides a template that can be applied to many 
specific versions of contingentism and necessitism. As Fine points out, various specific 
characterizations of the chunky contemplated in the book will not fit all versions of 
contingentism, but that was only to be expected. Only when contingentists starts fleshing 
out the barebones doctrine of contingentism in reasonable ways is there good reason to 
view them as marking genuine distinctions. This dependence on the version of 
contingentism at issue also means that his offer of his more rarefied sense of ‘actual’ in 
place of ‘chunky’ is unlikely to do the job, precisely because it does not depend on the 
specific versions at issue. In any case, since his introduction of his sense of ‘actual’ 
presupposes necessitism, it seems unsuitable for demarcating the neutral ground between a 
contingentist and a necessitist.   
 These are indeed complicated and somewhat elusive problems as to why, when, and 
how the contingentist and the necessitist need to capture each other’s distinctions. But such 
obscurities do less harm if confined to one part of the attempt to answer the overall 
question (contingentism or necessitism?), as they are in Modal Logic as Metaphysics, rather 
than infecting the question itself, thereby rendering any attempt to answer it problematic. 
They do not counterbalance the obscurity of the issue between actualism and possibilism. 
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Fine suggests that no problem like those just considered arises for the attempt to 
assess actualism and possibilism. He explains only very briefly why not, and what he says is 
puzzling. He writes: ‘For a “soft” actualist like myself, by contrast, there is no such problem; 
for I will be willing to accept whatever the possibilist says as true and hence will take myself 
to be under an obligation to account for its truth’. This cannot be right in general, for Fine’s 
actualist ‘claims that only actual objects are real, while the possibilist denies that this is so’. 
When the possibilist says ‘Some non-actual objects are real’, the actualist Fine is not willing 
to accept ‘Some non-actual objects are real’ as true, on pain of contradiction (his actualist 
and possibilist say the same thing when they use such a sentence). Perhaps he means only 
that he will be willing to accept as true whatever the possibilist says not involving ‘real’ and 
similar terms. But then there is still a problem about the sense, if any, in which the actualist 
can capture the distinctions marked in the possibilist’s use of sentences like ‘There are 
infinitely many real possible stars’. Is there meant to be some advantage in confining the 
differences between the actualist and the possibilist to sentences involving special 
metaphysical vocabulary such as ‘real’? 
There may be a dilemma here. First, suppose that there is no pressure on the 
actualist or possibilist to capture the distinctions marked in the other’s use of ‘real’. That 
would confirm the earlier suspicion that the use of the term is dangerously under-
constrained. Alternatively, suppose that there is such pressure. Then the dispute between 
actualism and possibilism raises complicated and somewhat elusive problems as to why, 
when, and how the actualist and the possibilist need to capture each other’s distinctions, 
similar to the problems raised by the dispute between contingentism and necessitism. 
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For all these reasons, I continue to regard ‘Contingentism or necessitism?’ as a much 
better question than ‘Actualism or possibilism?’ 
Fine formulates the rest of his paper in terms of actualism and possibilism rather 
than contingentism and necessitism. As he says, it is relatively ease to transpose what he 
says to fit the latter debate too, given the structural similarities. I will work with his 
formulations of his arguments here. 
 
 
2. Fine’s standard reduction 
 
In sections 2 and 3 of his paper, Fine sketches his original reduction of possibilist to actualist 
discourse (Fine 1977), and responds to two criticisms in Modal Logic as Metaphysics of an 
analogous attempt to map necessitist discourse to a neutral equivalent in the sense of F6, 
which are equally relevant to his reduction. He describes the reduction as ‘translational’ 
only in scare quotes. 
 My criticisms apply once the possibilist discourse goes beyond the limitations of a 
first-order language, in particular by the addition of a plural quantifier or other higher-order 
quantifiers. The initial difficulty for reducing the possibilist plural quantifier ΣV is that the 
modalized actualist plural quantifier ◊V is not an adequate substitute, because the former 
only requires some objects that individually can each be actual, while the latter requires 
some objects that jointly can all be actual together. Instead, Fine uses an infinite string of 
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modal operators and actualist singular quantifiers ◊ x1 ◊ x2 … (for the other required 
adjustments of the formula see Fine 1977, 2016). 
 Modal Logic as Metaphysics develops two objections to the adequacy of such strings 
as substitutes for the original plural quantifiers. The first is that the number of variables in 
the string will impose an (infinite) upper bound on the size of the pluralities taken into 
consideration, whereas the original plural quantifier imposes no such upper bound (pp. 353-
6). Fine is unsure what to say about the issues raised by this objection; he sketches but does 
not endorse one line of response. Partly for this reason, he no longer wishes to rely on such 
infinite strings in his reduction. I will nevertheless consider his more confident response to 
my second objection, because it is interesting in its own right. 
The second objection is to the very meaningfulness of infinite embeddings of 
operators. An infinite sequence of meaningful operators is not in general meaningful: the 
simplest example is an ω-sequence of negations ¬¬¬…. Fine agrees. However, he argues that 
we can make sense of applying infinitely many operations simultaneously, providing that 
they are all independent of each other. He says that he has no definition of ‘independent’, 
but he explains what he has in mind with examples. In one case, each operation is the 
syntactic substitution in a formula of a given expression for each occurrence of a given 
atomic expression of the same type; if no two substitutions are for the same atomic 
expression, the operations are all mutually independent and it makes sense to apply 
infinitely many of them simultaneously to an infinitary formula. In Fine’s other example, 
each operation is the flipping of a light switch; if no two operations are for the same switch 
(and presumably no two switches are for the same light!), they are all mutually independent 
and it makes sense to apply infinitely many of them simultaneously to infinitely many light 
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switches. Fine claims that the modalized quantifiers  ◊ x1, ◊ x2, … — or, as he prefers,        
◊ x1□, ◊ x2□, … — all perform mutually independent operations (given that the variables 
x1, x2, … are all mutually distinct), so that we can understand the infinite string as applying 
all those operations simultaneously to the semantic value supplied by the complement 
formula.  
I have no objection to simultaneously making infinitely many substitutions or flipping 
infinitely many switches. The question is whether simultaneously applying infinitely many 
modalized quantifiers is relevantly similar to Fine’s unproblematic examples. One obvious 
feature of the latter is that the operations are all local. He requires all the substitutions to 
be on non-overlapping constituents of the formula operated on, for otherwise things go 
wrong. Similarly, the flippings must all be of separate switches controlling separate lights. 
More generally, if a system has infinitely many non-overlapping constituents, it makes sense 
to perform simultaneous operations on each of these constituents. But do ◊ x1□, ◊ x2□, … 
perform local semantic operations in that sense? Each of them operates on a whole 
formula, just as other sentential operators do. When they are applied simultaneously to the 
same formula, their fields of operation clash. It is not enough that the variables x1, x2, … are 
all mutually distinct, for the simultaneous application of infinitely many quantifiers ‘no x1’, 
‘no x2’, … is just as problematic as the simultaneous application of infinitely many negations. 
Thus Fine’s examples are not similar enough to the case at issue to be of much help. 
Consider the two modal operators ◊ and □. What are we supposed to get when we 
apply them ‘simultaneously’ to a formula A? Do we get something equivalent to ◊□A (which 
is equivalent in Fine’s background modal logic S5 to □A), or to □◊A (which is equivalent in S5 
to ◊A), or something else entirely? Since there is no natural answer, ◊ and □ presumably 
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count as not independent of each other. Similarly, what are we supposed to get when we 
apply ◊ and  x1 ‘simultaneously’ to A? Do we get something equivalent to ◊ x1 A, or to  x1 
◊A (which is not equivalent to the former, since the Barcan and converse Barcan formulas 
presumably fail for Fine’s actualist quantifier), or something else entirely? Again, there is no 
natural answer, so ◊ and  x1 presumably count as not independent of each other. For 
similar reasons, □ and  x1 presumably count as not independent of each other. Thus the 
operators composing ◊ x1□ are not independent of the operators composing ◊ x2□. Why 
then should we believe that ◊ x1□ is independent of ◊ x2□? That would require some 
‘cancelling out’ of the numerous dependencies between their constituents. That such 
cancelling out occurs in this particular combination (but not most others) is not obvious; it 
would require a proof, for which we have no hint. Thus the appeal to independence fails to 
do the work Fine requires of it. 
Of course, one could interpret the simultaneous application of ◊ x1□, ◊ x2□, … as 
consisting in the simultaneous application of each occurrence of □, followed by the 
simultaneous application of the occurrences of  x1,  x2, …, followed by the simultaneous 
application of each occurrence of ◊. Naturally understood, that is equivalent to the 
application of ◊ x1,x2,…□. But, even if we forget the previous problem about cardinality, 
that is at best tantamount to the modalized actualist plural quantifier ◊V□, which is a 
compossibility reading of just the sort that gave rise to the original problem.  
If the meaning of the infinite sequence of modal operators and actualist quantifiers 
seems clear, it is because one finds the meaning of the possibilist plural quantifier to be 
reduced clear in its own right: but that is of no aid to the actualist reduction. Such an infinite 
sequence is equally unhelpful to the attempt to find a neutral equivalent of higher-order 
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necessitist discourse in the sense of F6. I stand by both the objections in Modal Logic as 
Metaphysics. 
 
 
3. Fine’s suppositional reduction 
 
In the second half of his paper, sections 4-7, Fine presents an ingenious new reduction of 
possibilist to actualist discourse, to replace his old one. It is finitary, thereby avoiding the 
problems just discussed. It is also robust, because it treats the higher-order facts as 
supervening on the first-order facts in a way that does not depend on how exactly the 
higher-order facts are formulated. If the reduction works, there will be a corresponding way 
of giving a neutral equivalent of higher-order necessitist discourse. 
 Fine’s new reduction uses an elaborate suppositional calculus, in which one can 
explicitly formulate complex suppositions and talk about what does or does not follow from 
them. The general idea is this. Let A be a formula in possibilist terms and A′ be the result of 
replacing all the possibilist quantifiers in A by corresponding actualist quantifiers. Then A is 
equivalent to a formula of the suppositional calculus saying that A′ follow from a certain 
complex supposition σ; τ in actualist terms. Very roughly, σ; τ is the supposition that things 
are just as they actually are on a possibilist description, except that everything is necessarily 
actual (even though actualists do not believe that, they can still suppose it). Fine’s account 
has many subtle details, for which the reader should consult his paper. 
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 The suppositional calculus is of great interest in its own right. As Fine suggests, it 
may well have many fruitful applications not touching the issues between actualism and 
possibilism and between contingentism and necessitism. My only concern here is with the 
legitimacy of Fine’s present application of it to those issues. I will argue that the supposition 
σ; τ cannot be understood in actualist terms, and therefore that Fine has not succeeded in 
reducing possibilist discourse to actualist discourse. A similar objection applies to the 
corresponding attempt to use the suppositional calculus to give a neutral equivalent of 
necessitist discourse. 
 To see the problem, we can examine one constituent σ1 of σ; τ. Fine writes it thus: 
(σ1)  Πx /□y (x = y)/ 
This needs careful unpacking. The quantifier Πx is a possibilist first-order universal 
quantifier. However, Fine uses it officially as an abbreviation of □ x□, where  x is an 
actualist first-order universal quantifier, though with the proviso that there may be some 
other way of formulating what σ1 means in actualist terms. Anyway, for clarity we may 
rewrite σ1 thus: 
(σ1A)  □ x□ /□y (x = y)/ 
Here y is an actualist first-order existential quantifier. Thus we may read □ y (x = y) as 
‘necessarily x is something actual’. Putting a formula between occurrences of / forms an 
instruction to suppose its content. Thus we may read /□ y (x = y)/ as: ‘suppose that 
necessarily x is something actual!’ Consequently, Πx in σ1 and □ x□ in σ1A are applied to 
instructions. As Fine explains, the intended effect is (and needs to be) not to form an 
instruction to suppose a universally quantified content but rather to suppose each instance. 
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Thus the intended effect of σ1A and σ1A is intended to be: ‘For every possible object, suppose 
that necessarily it is something actual!’ Can one do that?  
 Two initial worries are that one is being required to make too many suppositions 
simultaneously, and that some of those required suppositions are about objects to which 
one has no means of referring. However, those worries depend on a more psychologized 
view of supposing than Fine intends. They would be equally relevant to less metaphysically 
fraught instructions such as ‘For every grain of sand, suppose that it is on a beach’. As Fine 
explains, he is treating ‘suppose’ as a performative. If one felicitously says ‘For every grain of 
sand, suppose that is on a beach’, then for every grain of sand one thereby supposes that it 
is on a beach. There is no need for many phenomenologically separate acts of supposing, 
one for each grain of sand. So far, Fine is within his rights. 
 The deeper problem is this. Possible objects, in the possibilist’s sense, include some 
non-actual, merely possible objects. For each of those, σ1 and σ1A require one to suppose 
something about it. But to suppose something about a non-actual object is to go beyond 
actualist terms. Since those suppositions are integral to Fine’s plan, possibilist discourse has 
not been reduced to genuinely actualist discourse. 
 The difficulty is not confined to the component σ1 of the overall supposition σ; τ. It 
also arises for Fine’s components σ2 and σ3. Their details do not matter here, but they 
involve the application of possibilist universal quantifiers to conditional suppositions, where 
to make the conditional supposition A → /B/ is not to (unconditionally) suppose a 
conditional A → B, but rather if A holds to suppose B and otherwise to suppose nothing. The 
closest Fine comes to addressing the difficulty is in discussing the application of the 
possibilist quantifier to such conditional suppositions, but if what he says works for σ2 and 
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σ3, it will also work for σ1, since an unconditional supposition is equivalent to a conditional 
supposition with a tautologous antecedent. 
 Fine begins his discussion of the matter by noting that one can make sense of an 
indicative sentence such as Πx (◊A(x) → B(x)) in actualist terms (where A(x) and B(x) are not 
themselves problematic). His original reduction establishes that, since it works for first-
order modal languages and the possibilist quantifier Πx is first-order. So far so good. But if 
the actualist can make sense of Πx (◊A(x) → B(x)), Fine asks: 
Then what is to prevent him from making sense of the corresponding 
suppositional sentence Πx (◊A(x) → /B(x)/) (for every possible object x for 
which it is possible that A(x) suppose that B(x)), given that the only difference 
between them lies in the substitution of a supposition for a judgement? 
He is surely right that the difference between the act of supposition and the act of 
judgement does not matter here, for the task is to capture the content of the act in actualist 
terms, irrespective of which act it is. But what stands to Πx (◊A(x) → /B(x)/) as judgement 
stands to supposition is not the plain Πx (◊A(x) → B(x)). For, if there are many non-actual 
objects x for which it is possible that A(x), then Πx (◊A(x) → /B(x)/) expresses a complex act 
comprising many acts of supposing that B(x) for various non-actual objects x, whereas 
Πx (◊A(x) → B(x)) does not express a complex act comprising many acts of judging that B(x) 
for various non-actual objects x. The latter complex act goes outside the realm of the actual 
in exactly the same way as the former does. The proper notation for it would be something 
like Πx (◊A(x) → #B(x)#), where #B(x)# expresses the act of judging that B(x) just as /B(x)/ 
expresses the act of supposing that B(x). Of course, one can use Fine’s original reduct of 
Πx (◊A(x) → B(x)) to make a general judgement in actualist terms, but we have been given 
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no reason why doing so should involve many acts of judging that B(x) for various non-actual 
objects x. To take a simpler example, the actualist can make the general judgement that      
□ x□ ¬(C(x) & ¬C(x)) without making many individual judgements about non-actual 
objects. The rest of Fine’s discussion of the issue remains focussed on the structural analogy 
between supposition and judgement, and so misses the heart of the problem. 
 Of course, one can formulate general propositions in actualist terms about what is 
(actually) to be supposed: for instance, that necessarily for every actual object x necessarily 
if it is possible that A(x) then it is actually to be supposed that B(x). But that does not mean 
that the contents of the suppositions so described are themselves expressible in actualist 
terms. The actual may contain talk about the non-actual. Since we have been given no 
further reduction of B(x) for non-actual x to actualist discourse, to make the supposition 
/B(x)/ is to step outside actualist discourse. But making Fine’s overall supposition σ; τ 
involves making the constituent suppositions σ1, σ2, and σ3, which in turn involves making 
constituent suppositions of the form /B(x)/ for non-actual x. Thus making Fine’s overall 
supposition σ; τ involves stepping outside actualist discourse. Fine reduces a sentence A in 
possibilist discourse to the claim that the sentence A′ in actualist discourse follows from the 
supposition σ; τ. But since making that supposition involves stepping outside actualist 
discourse, we have not been given a reduction of possibilist to actualist discourse in any 
useful sense. 
 The same problem arises when Fine’s strategy is applied to the search for neutral 
equivalents of necessitist discourse. The contents of the relevant suppositions or 
judgements about individual non-actual objects fall outside the neutral zone, and so cannot 
be legitimately used. The neutral zone may contain talk about matters outside the neutral 
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zone. The strategy does not give us neutral equivalents of necessitist discourse in any useful 
sense. 
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